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Smart Homes:
The Next Fourth Amendment Frontier
Christina A. Robinson*

Under the third-party search doctrine, an individual does not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in information he or she
voluntarily discloses to third parties. “Always on” in-home
technology creates recordings of unsuspecting consumers in their
most intimate spaces and sends them to third party companies and
their affiliates, which makes this information subject to
warrantless search by law enforcement under the third-party
search doctrine. The third-party search doctrine is ill-suited to the
digital age, where consumers are routinely required to volunteer
information to third parties in order to access digital content. This
Note suggests that a warrant should be required where the
government attempts to search “always on” in-home technology.

*

This Note is dedicated to the people who made it possible for me to become a lawyer. To
my parents, Professor Thomas Robinson and Professor Christine Robinson, thank you for
loving me unconditionally, teaching me the value of education and integrity, and
supporting me in everything I do. To my siblings, Sita Whitaker-Robinson and “TC”
Robinson, thank you for being my guiding lights and always looking out for me as only
older siblings can. I am particularly grateful to my girlfriend, Megan Cheney, without
whose wisdom and patience this Note would never have been published. Special thanks to
Professor Tamara Lave, who introduced me to many of these cases and challenged me
throughout law school to become the best version of myself. Special thanks also to
Assistant Dean Marni Lennon who inspired me to use my law degree in service of others
and without whose friendship and mentorship I would not be where I am today.

1

2

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:2

I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 3
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................. 4
A. Alexa, Set an Alarm for 2020 ........................................................ 4
B. Alexa, Can You Solve This Murder Mystery? ............................... 7
III. STATEMENT OF THE LAW .................................................................... 8
A. Privacy Protection Under The Fourth Amendment ...................... 8
B. The Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard................ 9
C. The Foundations of the Third-Party Search Doctrine ................ 11
D. Advances in Technology Beget Changing Attitudes Toward
the Third-Party Search Doctrine ............................................... 12
E. Legal Trends Move Toward Heightened Protection for
Digital Information .................................................................... 14
IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS.................................................................... 17
A. Why a Warrant Should be Required for Data from “Always
On” In-Home Technology ......................................................... 19
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 22

2020]

SMART HOMES: THE NEXT FOURTH AMENDMENT FRONTIER

3

I. INTRODUCTION
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously.
Any sound that [a person] made, above the level of a very
low whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover, so long
as he remained within the field of vision which the metal
plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard.
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were
being watched at any given moment. How often, or on
what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any
individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable
that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate
they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to.
You had to live—did live, from habit that became
instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made
was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement
scrutinized. 1
Government surveillance is omnipresent in George Orwell’s famous
book, 1984. In the novel, home appliances simultaneously deliver digital
content to the protagonist, Winston Smith, and surveil his every move. 2
As a result, Winston knows he must be ever vigilant of his words and
actions, even inside his own home. Orwell’s novel was written in 1949 as
a glimpse into a potentially totalitarian future,3 but over thirty years after
the year 1984 how far away are we from Orwell’s dystopia becoming our
reality?
The scary truth may be that new “always on” in-home technology may
be bringing us closer to Orwell’s world than we realize. The Amazon Echo
Dot controversy in two murder investigations provides an easy example.
The Echo Dot is a relatively cheap smart home appliance—or, as you
might call it, a Christmas present. The device is designed to remain
powered on, always listening for the command word, “Alexa,” which
allows the user to control music and command smart home devices using
just his or her voice. 4 After voice activation the device records sound in
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 4 (1949).
Id.
3
Colin Marshall, George Orwell Explains in a Revealing 1944 Letter Why He’d Write
1984, OPEN CULTURE (Apr. 17, 2018), http://www.openculture.com/2014/01/georgeorwell-explains-in-a-revealing-1944-letter-why-hed-write-1984.html.
4
Eliott C. McLaughlin & Keith Allen, Alexa, Can You Help with This Murder Case?,
CNN (Dec. 28, 2018), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/28/tech/amazon-echo-alexa-bentonv
ille-arkansas-murder-case-trnd.
1
2
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the area around it for brief durations, and these recordings are stored by
Amazon. 5
Two murder investigations in which the government requested that
Amazon release recordings made by the Echo Dot inside the suspects’
homes raise an important question: Will the Echo Dot and similar
technology lead to the erosion of Fourth Amendment protection inside the
home? This Note discusses the implications of “always on” in-home
technology on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II expounds on the
privacy implications posed by the Echo Dot and similar “always on” inhome technology. Part III explains the current status of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence on the issue. Part IV provides suggested
solutions, and Part V concludes with final thoughts.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. Alexa, Set an Alarm for 2020
Smart devices are nearly ubiquitous in modern society. They do
everything from helping us check the weather to reading us the morning
news. A report by the Consumer Technology Association estimates that
the majority of households in the United States, a whopping sixty-nine
percent or 83 million households, own at least one smart home device;
eighteen percent or 22 million households own more than one smart
device. 6 Berg Insight, a Swedish research firm, estimates that 63 million
American homes will qualify as “smart” homes by 2022. 7 Over twentyfive percent of American households owned a smart home speaker in
2019, and that number is growing rapidly. 8 The Amazon Echo and the
Google Home are the most common smart speakers with the Apple
HomePod and other smart speakers close behind. 9 The United States has

5

Id.
Chuck Martin, Smart Home Technology Hits 69% Penetration in U.S., MEDIAPOST
(Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/341320/smart-hometechnology-hits-69-penetration-in-us.html.
7
Patrick Austin, What Will Smart Homes Look Like 10 Years From Now?, TIME (July
25, 2019), https://time.com/5634791/smart-homes-future/.
8
Sarah Perez, Over A Quarter of US Adults Now Own a Smart Speaker Typically an
Amazon Echo, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 8, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/08/over-aquarter-of-u-s-adults-now-own-a-smart-speaker-typically-an-amazon-echo/.
9
Id.
6
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the highest market penetration for smart speakers of any other country in
the world followed by China and the United Kingdom. 10
But how do these devices work? With seven microphones, the
Amazon Echo Dot, like other “always on” technology, voice-activates
when it hears its command word, “Alexa.” 11 The device is equipped with
sensors to hear users from any direction for up to twenty feet. 12 When the
Echo Dot is activated a blue light appears, and a tone can be heard that
indicates the device is ready to make a user query. 13 After hearing the
command word, the Echo Dot creates a recording of the user query and
any sound around it. 14 Once the command and any accompanying sounds
have been recorded, they are saved on Amazon’s servers and can be
reviewed (and deleted) manually by the user. 15 Importantly, even though
the Echo Dot is not recording when the device has not been activated with
the command word, it is still on and “always listening” for the command
word at all times. 16
The Amazon Echo Dot and other smart speakers are easy examples of
“always on” in-home technology, but “always on” devices that have the
ability to record in a home can and do come in many forms. Other “always
on” devices that can create recordings inside a home include the Google
Chrome browser, the Xbox Kinect, the Samsung Smart TV, and Mattel’s
Hello Barbie. 17 All of these devices save audio clips immediately before
and during user queries. 18

10
Shanhong Liu, Smart Home Voice Assistants Installed Base Share 2017-2019, by
Country, STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/878650/worldwidesmart-speaker-installed-base-by-country/.
11
McLaughlin, supra note 4.
12
Christopher Mele, Bid for Access to Amazon Echo Audio in Murder Case Raises
Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/28/
business/amazon-echo-murder-case-arkansas.html.
13
Raphael Davidian, Alexa and Third Parties’ Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, AM.
CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 58, 59–60 (2017), http://www.americancriminallawreview
.com/files/5114/9515/4188/ALEXA_AND_THIRD_PARTIES_REASONABLE_EXPE
CTATION_OF_PRIVACY_FINAL.pdf.
14
Mele, supra note 12.
15
Davidian, supra note 13, at 58.
16
Id. at 59. Indeed, that is why this technology is said to be “always on.” It is also worth
noting that the device may accidentally be triggered to record by mistake. For example, if
someone in the vicinity says the name “Alex,” the device may activate and trigger a
recording.
17
Letter from Marc Rotenberg et al., Exec. Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., to Att’y Gen.
Lynch & Chairwoman Ramirez, 3 (July 10, 2015), https://epic.org/privacy/internet/
ftc/EPIC-Letter-FTC-AG-Always-On.pdf.
18
Arielle M. Rediger, Always-Listening Technologies: Who Is Listening and What Can
Be Done About It?, 29 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 229, 231 (2017).
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Differences in software allow some of these devices even to record
audio clips of their surroundings when queries are not being made. 19 For
example, in 2015 Google conceded that its Chrome browser contained
code that regularly recorded private communications by turning on a
microphone that was actively listening to a user’s room without the user’s
knowledge or consent. 20 Similarly, the Xbox Kinect tracked users’
gestures, heartbeats, and facial expressions when it was turned on. But
even when turned off, the Xbox Kinect monitored conversations taking
place around it. 21 The Samsung TV routinely recorded private consumer
communications, both related and unrelated to the user query, and sent the
recordings to its third-party voice-to-text processor without encryption.22
In fact, when information surfaced in 2015 that Samsung’s voice-to-text
processing sent users’ private communications to third parties, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a complaint with the Federal
Trade Commission against Samsung, alleging violations of consumer
privacy and wiretapping laws. 23 By far, the most disturbing of the in-home
recording devices is the Hello Barbie, which used a built-in microphone
to record and transmit information gathered through conversations with
children to its toy conglomerate, Mattel, to analyze the child’s likes and
dislikes. 24
Many consumers seem to be shocked to find out that their private
communications are being recorded by the devices in their homes. 25 The
Electronic Privacy Information Center eloquently laid out concerns about
the privacy implications of these “always on” devices and others in a letter
to Attorney General Lynch and Chairwoman Ramirez in July 2015:
Americans do not expect that the devices in their homes
will persistently record everything they say. By
introducing ‘always on’ voice recording into ordinary
consumer products such as computers, televisions, and
toys, companies are listening to consumers in their most
private spaces. It is unreasonable to expect consumers to
Letter from Marc Rotenberg et al., supra note 17, at 2–5.
Id. at 2.
21
Id. at 3.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 1; Mike Snider, FTC: Vizio Smart TVs Spied on What Viewers Watched, USA
TODAY (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2017/02/06/vizi
o-pay-22m-smart-tv-data-gathering/97553144/. The Federal Trade Commission has not
announced any action on the complaint as of this writing, but Samsung did issue a statement
after the FTC complaint was filed saying that the voice-recognition feature was intended
to enhance the user experience and it could be disabled.
24
Letter from Marc Rotenberg et al., supra note 17, at 2.
25
Id. at 3.
19
20
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monitor their every word in front of their home
electronics. It is also genuinely creepy. 26
But if consumers are shocked to find out that these recordings are
being made at all, how might they feel if they knew the recordings could
also be turned over to law enforcement?

B. Alexa, Can You Solve This Murder Mystery?
On November 22, 2015, police from the Bentonville Police
Department in Arkansas found Victor Collins dead in a hot tub at the home
of James Bates. 27 After investigators discovered signs of a struggle, Bates
was charged with murder. 28 One witness said music had been streaming
from the house that night, 29 and during the search of his house police found
an Amazon Echo Dot on Bates’ kitchen counter. 30 Prosecutors served
Amazon with a warrant to obtain all audio recordings made from Bates’
Echo Dot in hopes they might contain information about Collins’ death. 31
Amazon fought the warrant on the grounds that it was overbroad, stating
at first that it “[would] not release customer information without a valid
and binding legal demand properly served on us[,]” 32 but ultimately with
Bates’ consent, Amazon turned the recordings over to prosecutors. 33 After
receiving the recordings from the Echo Dot, the main prosecutor, Nathan
Smith, began to doubt whether Bates actually committed the murder
stating, “I can’t stand in front of a jury and ask them to convict someone

Id. at 4–5.
Mele, supra note 12.
28
Id.
29
Amazon Hands Over Echo ‘Murder’ Data, BBC (Apr. 17, 2018), http://www.bbc.
com/news/technology-39191056.
30
Mele, supra note 12.
31
See id.; see also Jay Stanley, The Privacy Threat from Always-On Microphones like
the Amazon Echo, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog
/privacy-technology/privacy-threat-always-microphones-amazon-echo?redirect=blog/fre
e-future/privacy-threat-always-microphones-amazon-echo.
32
Arkansas Prosecutors Drop Murder Case That Hinged On Evidence From Amazon
Echo, NPR (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/29/56730
5812/arkansas-prosecutors-drop-murder-case-that-hinged-on-evidence-from-amazon-ech
o. Investigators also used information from a smart water meter on Bates’ property to
decide to file charges against him. The smart water meter showed a suspiciously large
consumption of water being used in the middle of the night.
33
Shona Gosh, Amazon Handed Over Alexa Recordings to the Police in a Murder Case,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-has-handed-alexarecordings-to-police-in-an-arkansas-murder-case-2017-3.
26
27
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beyond a reasonable doubt if I myself have a reasonable doubt [about who
committed this crime].” 34 Smith eventually moved to dismiss the case.35
Alexa was asked to testify in a second murder investigation in 2017.
On January 27, 2017, Jenna Pellegrini and Christine Sullivan were stabbed
to death in Farmington, New Hampshire, and Timothy Verrill was charged
with their murder. 36 An Amazon Echo Dot was sitting on the kitchen
counter, and Judge Steven Houran ordered Amazon to turn over the
recordings made from January 27, 2017 to January 29, 2017. 37 Amazon
similarly objected to the court order on the basis that it is overbroad and
inappropriate. 38 The case went to trial in October 2019 but resulted in a
mistrial. 39
Cases like these raise questions about data from the Amazon Echo Dot
and other “always on” in-home devices: Can recordings of our most
intimate spaces be turned over to law enforcement officers without our
consent––or a warrant?

III. STATEMENT OF THE LAW
A. Privacy Protection Under The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no [w]arrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . . describing the
place to be searched, and the . . . things to be seized.” 40 In the two centuries
following its enactment, the Supreme Court used the text of the Fourth
34
Nicole Chavez, Arkansas Judge Drops Murder Charge in Amazon Echo Case, CNN
(Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/us/amazon-echo-arkansas-murder-casedismissed/index.html?no-st=1526532257.
35
Id.
36
Harrison Thorp, Farmington Double-Murder Trial Postponed till October, could Last
Six Weeks, THE ROCHESTER VOICE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.therochestervoice.com
/farmington-double-murder-trial-postponed-till-october-could-last-six-weeks-cms-11914.
37
Meagan Flynn, Police Think Alexa May Have Witnessed a New Hampshire Double
Homicide. Now They Want Amazon to Turn Her Over, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/14/police-think-alexa-may-have-witnes
sed-new-hampshire-double-slaying-now-they-want-amazon-turn-her-over/; Perez, supra
note 8.
38
Perez, supra note 8.
39
Kyle Stucker, ‘We failed’: Mistrial Declared in Double-Murder Case, FOSTERS.COM
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.fosters.com/news/20191031/we-failed-mistrial-declared-indouble-murder-case
40
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Amendment to craft a set of procedural rules to balance law enforcement
needs against individual privacy interests. 41 The warrant clause of the
Fourth Amendment mandates that a warrant be issued based on a finding
of probable cause by a neutral magistrate. 42 In the absence of a warrant,
the government must articulate one of several exceptions to the warrant
requirement or risk the inadmissibility of evidence at trial. 43 The
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
government officials.” 44 The Supreme Court is charged with providing the
same degree of Fourth Amendment protection today as that afforded when
it was adopted, 45 yet Fourth Amendment standards have struggled to keep
pace with evolving technology that allows for new government
surveillance techniques. 46

B. The Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard
For three decades, government surveillance primarily triggered a
Fourth Amendment violation under the “trespass doctrine.” 47 The trespass
doctrine invokes Fourth Amendment protections when the government
physically invades an individual’s property without a warrant. 48 For
example, in Silverman v. United States the Supreme Court found that the
government violated the Fourth Amendment by listening to the
defendant’s private communicates using a “spike mike” placed on the
defendant’s home-heating duct because the government had physically
penetrated his property. 49 However, wiretapping technology capable of
recording private conversations in the absence of a physical intrusion was
soon introduced. 50 With the advent of this new wiretapping technology,
the Supreme Court was forced to rethink the trespass doctrine and
articulate a new Fourth Amendment standard.
Initially, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court decided that
Fourth Amendment protections did not apply to information obtained by
41
See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
536 (2005).
42
See id. at 536–37.
43
See id.
44
Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City and City of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
45
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001).
46
See Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and Jones: The Implications of United States
v. Jones–A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683, 683–85 (2013).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–11 (1961).
50
David A. Harris, Riley v. California and the Beginning of the End for the Third-Party
Search Doctrine, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 927–28 (2016).
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the government in the absence of a physical trespass. 51 However, Justice
Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead contained seeds of change that would
revolutionize Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 52 Justice Brandeis
believed that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to keep pace
with advances in modern technology, which would create new possibilities
for the government to invade individual privacy:
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were
adopted, . . . [f]orce and violence were then the only
means known to man by which a government could
directly effect self-incrimination . . . . But ‘time works
change, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes.’ Subtler and more far-reaching means of
invading privacy have become available to the
government. Discovery and invention have made it
possible for the government . . . to obtain disclosure in
court of what is whispered in the closet . . . . The makers
of our Constitution . . . . sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their emotions, and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone––the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 53
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court overruled the majority’s
opinion in Olmstead, providing that the Fourth Amendment protects
individuals even in the absence of a physical intrusion and emphasizing
that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”54 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated the standard that continues
to govern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence today: A Fourth Amendment
violation occurs where law enforcement officials infringe on an
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy so long as society deems
that expectation to be objectively reasonable. 55
An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is greatest in his or
her home. 56 In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the
51
52
53
54
55
56

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–478 (1928).
Id. at 471–85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Kerr, supra note 41, at 536.
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government’s use of a thermal-imaging device without a warrant to
discover information about the contents of a home, which would be
otherwise unknown without a physical intrusion, violated the Fourth
Amendment. 57 In an impassioned majority opinion, Justice Scalia
emphasized the importance of safeguarding privacy in the home in the face
of advances in modern technology. 58 He depicted protection of the home
from prying government eyes as the constitutional minimum reasonable
expectation of privacy demanded by the Fourth Amendment. 59 Justice
Scalia rejected the argument that a failure to discern intimate details about
the home prevented a Fourth Amendment violation because “[i]n the
home, our cases show, all details are intimate details[.]” 60

C. The Foundations of the Third-Party Search Doctrine
Under the Katz test, an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information that he or she voluntarily discloses to third parties
under the third-party search doctrine. 61 The third-party search doctrine was
first discussed at length in United States v. Miller. 62 In Miller, the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information that
has been revealed to third parties, even if the information was revealed on
the assumption that it would be used for a limited purpose and that the
third party would maintain its privacy.63 The Court found that Miller had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
disclosed to his bank, and the government could lawfully subpoena his
bank records as evidence to be used against him in a criminal
prosecution. 64 In other words, “[t]he depositor [assumes] the risk in
revealing his affairs to another[] that the information [would] be
conveyed” to the government. 65
The Supreme Court expanded the scope of the third-party search
doctrine to include information voluntarily revealed to a phone company
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001).
Id. at 40 (advocating that it would be foolish to assert that privacy protection under
the Fourth Amendment has been unaffected by the advance of technology).
59
Id. at 28. By contrast, an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
anything in “open fields” or in the plain view of a police officer. In Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984), the Supreme Court held that an individual does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in information in “open fields,” where any member of
the public can look.
60
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. Importantly, the scope of Kyllo is limited to new technology
that is not in general public use.
61
Id. at 27–28.
62
Harris, supra note 50, at 904.
63
Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435, 443–46 (1976).
64
Id. at 445–46.
65
Id. at 443.
57
58
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in Smith v. Maryland. 66 The Court reasoned that telephone users have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the outward numbers they dial
because users know they must convey information about these numbers to
telephone companies, which record this information for legitimate
business purposes. 67 The Court distinguished this case from Katz by
saying that the device employed by the government registered only the
numbers dialed, not the contents of the communication. 68 The Court also
rejected the argument that the numbers should be entitled to greater
protection because they were dialed using a phone from inside the
defendant’s house because, “[r]egardless of his location, [the] petitioner
had to convey that number to the telephone company in precisely the same
way if he wished to complete his call.” 69 Citing Miller, the Court affirmed
that an individual who discloses information to a third party assumes the
risk that this information will be provided to law enforcement. 70

D. Advances in Technology Beget Changing Attitudes Toward the
Third-Party Search Doctrine
The Supreme Court readdressed the third-party search doctrine in
United States v. Jones. The issue in Jones was whether the warrantless
GPS tracking of a person’s car constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.
At first, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test was used in the
Supreme Court’s decisions involving GPS technology to track suspects. 71
United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo were factually similar to
Jones—all three cases involved government surveillance of the
defendant’s movements using GPS technology—yet both Knotts and Karo
were decided on the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard. 72
But in a surprising turn of events, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, sidestepped the Katz analysis and instead revived the trespass
doctrine. 73 Justice Scalia distinguished Knotts and Karo from Jones by
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46, (1979).
Id. at 743.
68
Id. at 741.
69
Id. at 743.
70
Id. at 744.
71
The two cases on point are United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) and
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). In Knotts, the Supreme Court held that
tracking a defendant by placing a device inside a container he subsequently acquired did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because the suspect did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements on public thoroughfares.71 On similar facts in
Karo, the Court held that tracking the defendant when his car was parked inside a private
residence did violate his reasonable expectation of privacy.71
72
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–10 (2012).
73
Id.
66
67
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saying that a trespass had not occurred in either case because the
government placed the tracking device on the property before the
defendant took possession of it. 74 Justice Scalia made clear that in Jones
the government placed its tracking device on the defendant’s car after he
had taken possession of it, which made the case ripe for determining it
based on the trespass doctrine. 75 Because a car constituted an “effect”
under the Fourth Amendment the government physically trespassed onto
the defendant’s car after he had already taken possession of it, the
government violated the Fourth Amendment under the trespass doctrine. 76
In a famous concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor agreed that the
trespass doctrine was sufficient to decide Jones, but she criticized the
majority for being shortsighted: “In cases of electronic or other novel
means of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on
property, the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little
guidance.” 77 She then challenged Justice Scalia’s notion that people have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the sum of their public movements
and laid out several reasons why a Katz inquiry was relevant in Jones: GPS
monitoring allows the government access to information about one’s most
private associations; GPS tracking information can be stored and mined
by the government for years to come; the information is cheap to gather so
it evades normal checks on law enforcement officers; and the awareness
that the government might be watching chills associational and expressive
freedoms. 78 In light of these attributes, she said she would ask “whether
people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or
less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” 79
Justice Sotomayor then addressed what she believed to be the more
important underlying issue in Jones, which was the inevitable need to reevaluate the third-party search doctrine in light of advances in modern
technology. 80 She believed that allowing the third-party search doctrine to
continue to control would give the government unchecked power over
routinely disclosed consumer data:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties . . . This
74
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Id. at 408–09.
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Id. at 401.
Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks . . . I would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to
Fourth Amendment protection. 81
Thus, as Justice Sotomayor noted, the majority in Jones effectively
left open the question of whether warrantless government surveillance to
track the aggregate of an individual’s movements in the absence of a
physical intrusion would violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence indicated that the third-party search doctrine
should be re-evaluated in light of advances in modern technology.

E. Legal Trends Move Toward Heightened Protection for Digital
Information
Around the same time as Jones, some lower courts began to treat
digital information with a heightened expectation of privacy. For example,
in United States v. Mitchell, the Eleventh Circuit held that the detention of
the defendant’s computer for a duration outside the scope of the warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment, especially because a computer hard drive
is “the digital equivalent of its owner’s home, capable of holding a
universe of private information.” 82 In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth
Circuit held that a subscriber maintains a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of emails stored, sent, or received through an
Internet Service Provider, and the government may only compel the
Internet Service Provider to turn over the contents of the subscriber’s
emails by first obtaining a warrant. 83
The trend toward treating digital information with a heightened
expectation of privacy continued in the United States Supreme Court in
2014 with Riley v. California. In Riley, the Court took a firm position to
protect digital information by imposing a warrant requirement on cell
phone searches incident to arrest. 84 The Court stated that “[m]odern cell
phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those
implicated by the search of [other physical items]” because of their
immense storage capacity, the tendency that information derived from a
81
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cell phone search could reveal much more about a suspect’s personal life
in combination than in isolation, and the fact that Cloud computing
allowed law enforcement to effectively search information contained in
the home. 85
The most recent United States Supreme Court case to address the issue
of digital privacy was Carpenter v. United States. 86 The case challenged
the application of the third-party search doctrine to cell-site location
information (CSLI). 87 Prior to the opinion, state and federal courts
remained divided on issues relating to the third-party search doctrine. 88
United States v. Davis exemplifies this split. A majority of the en banc
Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith and
Miller were controlling and, thus, the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his cell-site location information. 89 However,
two separate lower court concurrences called on the Supreme Court to
clarify the scope of Smith and Miller. One concurrence written by Judge
Rosenbaum was particularly compelling:
In our time, unless a person is willing to live ‘off the grid’
it is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing the most
personal of information to third-party service providers
on a constant basis, just to navigate daily life. And the
thought that the government should be able to access such
information without the basic protection that a warrant
offers is nothing less than chilling . . . . 90
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Carpenter on June 22, 2018. 91 In the case, the Assistant United States
Attorney investigating a string of robberies requested a court order to
provide 152 days’ worth of Carpenter’s historical cell-site location data
under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 92 Under the
Stored Communications Act, an order may be issued when the government
“offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication,
or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an
Id. at 2488–92.
Carpenter v. United States, 585 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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ongoing criminal investigation.” 93 The “reasonable grounds” standard
requires significantly less than probable cause.94 Federal magistrate judges
issued two court orders directing MetroPCS and Sprint to disclose
Carpenter’s location information. 95
Carpenter was charged with six counts of robbery and an additional
six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence. 96 Prior
to trial, Carpenter moved to suppress the cell-site data provided by the
wireless carriers on the basis that the government’s failure to obtain a
warrant prior to accessing his data violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. 97 The district court denied the motion, the government relied on the
location information at trial, and Carpenter was convicted. 98 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 99
The Supreme Court held in Carpenter that obtaining CSLI was a
search under the Fourth Amendment and required a warrant in order to be
valid. 100 The Court began its analysis by reaffirming that individuals have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical
movements. 101 Then, the Court addressed the third-party search doctrine,
which had been the government’s main argument for obtaining the
information. 102 The Court distinguished in nature and scope the search that
occurred in Carpenter from the foundational third-party search doctrine
cases, stating that “there is a world of difference between the limited types
of person information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive
chronicle of location information casually collected [today] by wireless
carriers.” 103

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) (2019)).
Id. at 2221 (“The Government acquired the cell-site records pursuant to a court order
issued under the Stored Communications Act, which required the Government to show
‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that the records were ‘relevant and material to an
ongoing investigation.’ That showing falls well short of the probable cause required for a
warrant.”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) (2019)).
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Id. at 2217–19 (“Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that
the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to
Fourth Amendment protection. Whoever the suspect [of a crime] turns out to be, he has
effectively been tailed every moment of every day . . . and the police may—in the
Government’s view—call upon the results of that surveillance without regard to the
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Next, the Court distinguished the voluntary consent as being of a
different kind than the foundational third-party search doctrine cases. 104
The Court stated that “carrying [a cell phone] is indispensable to
participation in modern society[,]” and a user cannot meaningfully assume
the risk of volunteering information to a third party because “[a]part from
disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving
behind a trail of location data.” 105 As a result, the government should have
been required to obtain a warrant prior to gaining access to Carpenter’s
cell-site location information. 106 However, the Court made explicitly clear
that its decision in this case was “a narrow one[]” that did not “disturb the
application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional
surveillance techniques . . . .” 107
Thus, the Supreme Court has twice ruled to protect digital information
derived from cell phones by requiring a warrant be obtained prior to
gaining access to the user’s information. 108 However, the Supreme Court
has not yet ruled on whether a warrant would be required to access other
types of digital information such as recordings from smart devices.
Because the decision in Carpenter was a narrow one, the Court has left
open the question of how much, if any, digital information from “always
on” in-home technology would be subject to search by law enforcement
and whether a warrant would be required to obtain access to this
information.

IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
This Note argues that a warrant should be required when the
government attempts to search recordings made by “always on” in-home
technology. This solution is the most complete because it strikes an
appropriate balance between governmental interests in enforcing the law
and individual privacy interests: law enforcement officials can obtain
sensitive digital information so long as they obtain a warrant before doing
so.
Notably, this solution comes at the cost of making it more difficult for
the police to solve crimes by preventing them from acquiring valuable
evidence in criminal investigations. This begs the question: Should we
constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Only the few without cell phones could escape this
tireless and absolute surveillance.”).
104
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105
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106
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make it more difficult for the government to obtain access to our most
private information in order to solve crimes by requiring a warrant be
issued before doing so?
The Supreme Court grappled with a similar question when it
determined whether to apply the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio. 109 Applying the exclusionary rule to the states would undoubtedly
let guilty people walk free by excluding incriminating evidence from
criminal trials because it was obtained by the police illegally.110 After
deciding that the exclusionary rule should be applied to the states, Justice
Clark wrote for the majority in Mapp that, “[t]he criminal goes free, if he
must, but it is the law that sets him free.” 111 In United States v. Leon, the
Court again confronted the exclusionary rule issue and attempted to
balance governmental interests against the individual privacy protections
engrained in the Fourth Amendment. 112 In ardent dissent, Justice Brennan
wrote the following:
While the machinery of law enforcement and indeed the
nature of crime itself have changed dramatically since the
Fourth Amendment became part of the Nation’s
fundamental law in 1791, what the Framers understood
then remains true today—that the task of combating crime
and convicting the guilty will in every era seem of such
critical and pressing concern that we may be lured by the
temptations of expediency into forsaking our commitment
to protecting individual liberty and privacy. It was for that
very reason that the Framers of the Bill of Rights insisted
that law enforcement efforts be permanently and
unambiguously restricted in order to preserve personal
freedoms. In the constitutional scheme they ordained the
sometimes unpopular task of ensuring that the
government’s enforcement efforts remain within the strict
boundaries fixed by the Fourth Amendment . . . . 113
Thus, while it is true that the solutions suggested in this Note will
hinder law enforcement officers from solving crimes, as Justice Brennan
observed, the Fourth Amendment demands protection of individual liberty
against arbitrary government intrusion. To be clear, this Note does not
suggest that the government should not be able to obtain access to any
109
110
111
112
113

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961).
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digital information to aid in criminal investigations––just that it seek a
warrant before doing so.

A. Why a Warrant Should be Required for Data from “Always On”
In-Home Technology
In analyzing future cases, the Supreme Court would do well to extend
the precedent set by Riley and Carpenter to data derived from “always on”
in-home technology. The Court should find that the information derived
from “always on” in-home technology is akin to that in Carpenter and is
sensitive in nature and broader in scope than the information collected in
Smith and Miller. Furthermore, the Court should find that “always on” inhome technology is akin to the CSLI collected in Carpenter because there
is no meaningful consent for the collection of data from devices that are
“always on.”
The Supreme Court in Carpenter first distinguished the nature and
scope of the information derived from Smith and Miller as being more
limited in nature than that of CSLI. 114
The Government’s position fails to contend with the
seismic shift[] in digital technology [have] made possible
the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also
everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and
years . . . Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on
comings and goings, [Sprint Corporation and its
competitors] are ever alert, and their memory is nearly
infallible. There is a world of difference between the
limited types of personal information addressed in Smith
and Miller and the exhaustive chronical of location
information casually collected by wireless carriers
today. 115
The Court pointed out that the pen register in Smith had limited
capabilities to reveal identifying information and the checks in Miller were
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions, not
confidential communications. 116 The Court in Riley also addressed the
sensitive nature of information derived from a cell phone and
distinguished it in several important ways from information derived from
other physical objects: A cell phone collects in one place many types of
information that reveal much more in combination than in isolation; a cell
114
115
116
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phone’s capacity allows even one type of information to reconstruct the
sum of an individual’s private life; the data on the phone dates back to the
phone’s purchase or even earlier; and finally, a cell phone allows an
individual to store in a portable location a great number of records that
would not be accessible in a physical format. 117
Like in Riley and Carpenter, information derived from “always on”
in-home technology can be stored by Amazon or its competitors for years
with infallible memory—smart device company servers also have
immense storage capabilities, and it is common for recordings taken from
“always on” devices to be stored for between six months to two years.118
Also like cell phones, the aggregate of these recordings has the potential
to reveal much more together than in isolation about an individual’s
private life and accessing aggregated recordings from a device from inside
the home could, without a doubt, reveal an individual’s religious, political,
or sexual habits more than any one recording could in isolation.119 For
example, an Amazon Echo Dot that is located near a television would
undoubtedly reveal snippets of any television program playing in the
background during the user query, which could reveal information about
the person’s religious, political, or sexual habits.
“Always on” technology allows law enforcement officers to access
digital recordings that were produced inside a home. Under normal
circumstances, law enforcement officers would not be allowed to enter the
home without a warrant unless one of the well-defined exceptions to the
warrant requirement applied. 120 Law enforcement officers would certainly
not be allowed to plant a recording device inside a home without a
warrant. 121 But under the third-party search doctrine today, simply because
the recordings from “always on” in-home devices were released to a third
party, the government is effectively able to do indirectly what it could not
do directly: Access recordings of consumers in their most intimate spaces
without a warrant. Allowing the third-party search doctrine to swallow
privacy protection in the home goes against the holdings in Riley, in
Carpenter, and in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Kyllo where he
emphasized that “[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–90 (2014).
Tim Moynihan, Alexa and Google Home Record What You Say. But What Happens
to that Data?, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/alexa-and-googlerecord-your-voice/.
119
McLaughlin, supra note 4. This problem is further exacerbated when more than one
device is at issue. For example, as noted above James Bates had both an Amazon Echo Dot
and a smart water device.
120
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
121
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–11 (1961).
117
118

2020]

SMART HOMES: THE NEXT FOURTH AMENDMENT FRONTIER

21

details[.]” 122 Unlike the limited nature of the information in Smith and
Miller, the fact that these recordings were made inside a home makes the
likelihood that they contain sensitive information much greater and the
need to protect this information much more significant.
The Court in Carpenter also distinguished the information derived
from a cell phone on the basis that there is no meaningful consent to
disclose the information to a third party as there was in Smith and Miller. 123
A cell phone automatically generates CSLI when it is powered on without
any affirmative act on the part of the user, and there is no way to escape it
doing so other than to remain off the grid. 124 As a result, the user does not
in any meaningful sense volunteer this information to a third party and,
thus, does not assume the risk of turning over the information to law
enforcement. 125
Information derived from “always on” in-home technology is also not
volunteered to a third party in any meaningful sense. When one buys or
installs a smart speaker or other “always on” in-home device, there is no
warning label that indicates that the device may be recording you or turned
over to law enforcement.126 While it is true that cell phones are much more
prevalent, a significant number of people own “always on” smart devices
and use them within their homes. 127 These individuals do not suspect that
these devices will be recording them in their most intimate spaces, saving
those recordings on company servers, or sharing them with third party
affiliates. 128 As a result, the Supreme Court should extend the holdings in
Riley and in Carpenter to protect information derived from “always on”
devices used inside a home and find that a warrant is required before this
information is obtained by law enforcement.
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V. CONCLUSION
Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, recordings from
“always on” technology made inside a home are not protected from prying
government eyes under the third-party search doctrine. A warrant should
be required to obtain recordings from “always on” in-home devices. The
year 1984 came and went without turning into Orwell’s government
surveillance nightmare. Today, no one should have to fear that recordings
from their most intimate spaces can be provided to the government without
their consent—or a warrant—because of the third-party search doctrine.
No person should have to be afraid to speak candidly in his or her home
for fear that “Big Brother is watching.”

